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The High Cost of Scholarly Journals 
(And What To Do About It)* 
 
 
 
Why do scholarly journals cost so much? Is it the high costs of publishing or something else? 
Most importantly, what can be done? These questions have grown in importance over the past several 
years, but they have assumed new urgency given the extremely tight budgets facing most universities 
today.  
 
For example, the University of Nebraska-Lincoln library subscription for one year to The 
Journal of Physical Chemistry cost $3,463 in 2003. The International Journal of Plant Sciences cost 
$587. The Journal of Economics and Business was $493, Economics Letters cost $1,823, and 
Tetrahedron Letters was a whopping $10,345 per year.  Only the humanities journals 
provided some relief, with the Publications of the Modern Language Association at $132, Shakespeare 
Quarterly (reflecting a Project Muse discount) at $40, and Poetry at $39. 
 
  Perhaps more alarming, the increase in journal prices has been enormous and virtually 
constant. During the ten-year period 1993 to 2003,when the Consumer Price Index increased by about 
27%, the cost to Nebraska for the International Journal of Plant Sciences increased from $140 to $587, 
and increase of 319 %; the Journal of Physical Chemistry went from $1,168 to $3,463, an increase of 
196 %; and the Journal of Economics and Business rose from $180 to $493, an increase of 174 %; .  
According to data collected by the Association of Research Libraries (and available at 
www.arl.org/stats), during the 16-year interval between 1986 and 2001,scholarly journals prices 
overall increased by 8.5 % per year, while the CPI grew by 3.4 % per year. These differing inflation 
rates mean that over the entire 16-year period, journal prices jumped by 215%, the CPI just 64%.  
Journal prices even grew twice as fast as health care prices during the same period.  Such increases in 
journal prices appear likely to continue. 
 
In consequence, research libraries and especially university libraries are perpetually in crisis as 
they struggle to find enough money to maintain their journal subscriptions--by demanding bigger 
budgets, by shifting funds from other library operations (e.g., reducing acquisition of monographs), 
*A version of this article appeared in Change, November/December 2003, pp. 
10-19.  The authors modified the copyright provision supplied to Change 
such that the magazine had exclusive publication rights for the article for only 
six months.  Since that period has elapsed, the article is being distributed to 
you under the rights retained by the authors. 
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and by regularly pruning their journals list. All of these strategies have seriously damaged the 
libraries’ effectiveness in supporting research.  For example, if libraries cannot provide the most recent 
research results, scientists will waste valuable time and resources needlessly replicating work that has 
been done by others, time that could be better spent in building on known research findings. 
 
Of course, consumer complaints of high prices are not very reliable guides to whether prices 
are too high. Whether responding to automobile “sticker shock” or health insurance premiums or the 
cost of Broadway tickets, high prices often just reflect the high costs of providing the good or service. 
The same might be true for scholarly journals. 
 
Perhaps the question should be: Despite high prices and inflation, why shouldn’t journal 
prices simply be left to the unfettered private market, like most other prices in our economy?  We 
believe that the answer is that an unexamined reliance on the market has helped create a crisis in 
scholarly communications. Unless something is done to reverse the situation, serious and perhaps 
irreparable harm will be done to the nation’s research and scholarly enterprise. 
 
 
The Market for Scholarly Journals 
 
Two features of the market for scholarly journals make it, if not unique, at least unusual. 
The first is that the specific “product” being sold is one for which the users can find no close 
substitute. In an ordinary market, say for fast food or computers, when the price of one brand 
increases too much, consumers begin to switch to an alternative. This possibility, even the threat 
of it, is an essential part of the competitive process and keeps prices in check. When no shifting 
is possible – for example, when households buy electricity from the local power company or 
someone sends first-class mail – prices are usually carefully regulated.  
 
Scholarly journals, as a delivery system, are more like first-class mail than computers.  If 
the price of Tetrahedron Letters rises too high, consumers (mostly libraries) cannot switch to a 
lower-priced journal as a pretty good substitute. Scientists need to keep abreast of the latest work 
in their field.  If the intellectual content of Tetrahedron Letters (or any journal) is unique, and if 
the library’s users cannot get access to its ideas or results, there is no good substitute. The 
library’s choice is either to pay the price or have its users deprived of the material; no lower-cost 
close substitute is possible. As a result, demand for scholarly journals is highly inelastic.  
 
Scholarly journals are not all alike, of course, and the lack of acceptable substitutes more 
closely characterizes the very high quality, widely respected, and frequently cited journals than it 
does the much larger group of lower-tier journals. Becoming a top-tier journal is very difficult. 
Generally a journal gains that cachet only over many decades, by having top scholars serve as 
referees and as members of the editorial board, and by publishing the work of those who are at 
the very height of their profession. Thus, the supply of top-quality journals is also relatively 
inelastic.    
  
The second significant feature of the market for scholarly journals is the substantial and 
rapidly growing concentration among suppliers. Ulrich’s International Periodicals Directory 
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puts the total number of journals now being published at about 161,000, with growth of about 
4,000 per year from 1985 to the present. A smaller number might more properly be identified as 
scholarly journals; for example, among the 100 top-ranked university research libraries in 2002, 
the median number of periodical subscriptions (most of which presumably are scholarly journals) 
was 28,031. Of course, fewer still are high quality, widely respected, and frequently cited.  
 
Academic journals are published by scholarly societies, universities, private associations, 
and, of increasing importance, for-profit firms. Indeed, a relatively small group of commercial 
publishers have become important suppliers of the scholarly journals, especially the top-tier 
ones, as the journal lists of for-profit publishers expanded rapidly in the last two decades. The 
top six companies together publish about 4,000 journals, and the biggest publisher, Elsevier 
Science (the academic publishing arm of Reed Elsevier Group plc), produces approximately 
1,850 journals.  
 
The combination of a product without substitutes and concentration among suppliers of 
high quality journals might be expected to produce high prices and – until an equilibrium or 
“maximum-amount-the-traffic-will-bear” is reached – rapid price increases. Mark McCabe’s 
careful 1998 econometric study (available at www.arl.org) found that “prices are indeed 
positively related to firm portfolio size [i.e., number of journals published by a firm], and that 
mergers [of firms] result in significant price increases.” 
 
Still, if high and rising prices merely reflect underlying costs that are also high and rising, 
then as much as libraries or other subscribers might complain, the prices would nonetheless be 
justified. Because they are proprietary, direct measures of the producers’ costs are generally not 
available to test this point, as corporate returns are not frequently broken out in such detail so as 
to establish cost for a given kind of business.  However, there are three strong indirect indicators 
that suggest the contrary. 
 
First, high and rising prices unmatched by similar patterns in costs would be expected to 
produce high profits. And indeed, profits among the commercial journal publishers have been 
very high. Brendan Wiley, in a 1998 study, found the profits of four major commercial 
publishers of scientific journals to be 18.8% in 1997, more than 3.5 times the average 5% net 
profit for the periodical industry.  Profits for the largest firm in the industry, Elsevier, averaged 
about 37% between 1995 and 2001.   
 
Second, some journal publishers did not raise prices so dramatically, yet apparently 
continued to cover their costs, suggesting that rising costs were not the principal driver of higher 
prices. Prices of journals produced by (non-profit) professional societies increased on average 
less than those of commercial publishers.  Still, some professional societies have come to rely on 
surpluses (that is, profits) from their journal operations to support their other operations, so even 
their journal prices are most likely misleadingly high if used as an index of underlying costs.  
More revealing are a few other examples. The price of the Journal of Political Economy, a first-
tier journal in economics published by the University of Chicago Press, rose only 48% between 
1992 and 2002 (during which time the CPI rose 28 %). The price of the American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, published by the American Agricultural Economics Association, 
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increased about 67% over that period. Shakespeare Quarterly actually decreased in price, by 
about 16%, between 1992 and 2002. Examples are not proof, of course, but if these journals can 
publish, using basically the same materials, labor, technology, mailing costs, etc., as the journals 
with rapidly escalating prices, it suggests that something other than production costs may be 
driving up commercial and society journal prices.  
 
Third, scholarly books, which largely involve the same production technology as 
journals, showed much slower increases in price. According to ARL data, the cost of 
monographs purchased by libraries rose by 66% between 1986 and 2000, whereas as we saw, 
prices of scholarly journals increased by 226%.  Production costs do not appear to be why 
journal prices rose more than three times more than book prices.  
  
So there are powerful reasons for believing that high and rising prices are due not to 
costs, but rather to the combination of highly inelastic demand and suppliers’ substantial market 
power.  One might anticipate that high and sustained profits would attract competitors into the 
industry and thus dilute excess profits.  The first part of this hypothesis is true: Between 1986 
and 2000, the number of titles (based on Ulrich) increased by more than 62%. Unfortunately for 
libraries and scholars, the annual rate of increase in journal prices remained stubbornly close to 
9%, even as many more journals were published. It appears that even as the number of titles 
increased, so did the market dominance of the biggest suppliers.  
 
Thus, the market for scholarly journals as currently constituted appears to be one in 
which, because of its distinctive features, price competition is weak or nearly absent; a few 
dominant suppliers extract huge profits; and few of the “self-correction” mechanisms are present 
that are crucial if markets are to serve the public interest. But there is an additional characteristic 
of scholarly journals that further undermines reliance on an unregulated market.  
 
 
Knowledge as a Public Good 
 
Scholarship, and hence the content of scholarly journals, is a public good. A public good 
is one for which one consumer’s use of the good is not competitive with, or exclusive of, another 
consumer’s use of the same good. The classic illustration is national defense – some citizens 
cannot be defended without all being defended. But an illustration closer to home is a 
community’s clean air – one resident’s enjoyment of clean air does not interfere with another’s 
enjoyment of the same “good.” So too, one scholar’s access to and benefit from the knowledge 
found in a scientific article published in a scholarly journal in no way limits another scholar’s use 
of and benefit from that knowledge. Lawrence Lessig (in The Future of Ideas) and others have 
termed this type of consumption “nonrivalous.” 
 
It has long been recognized that provision of public goods cannot be efficiently organized 
through the private market. For some public goods such as clean air and national defense, it is 
technically impossible to exclude users; in such cases, people would not voluntarily pay when 
they would receive the good anyway, and so the market fails.  
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For other public goods, where it is technically possible to deny access to non-payers, 
society gets less than the full benefit of the good if some users are excluded. For example, 
society’s eradication of smallpox produced the public good of a smallpox-free society, enjoyed 
by everyone. If access to the smallpox vaccine had been left to the private market, rich 
individuals and individuals in rich countries would have protected themselves but the benefit for 
the public good would have been lost. Governments and the World Health Organization found 
these prospects unacceptable and generally either heavily subsidized distribution of the vaccine 
or distributed it for free, producing the world-wide elimination of smallpox. The market simply 
failed to be the appropriate device for attacking smallpox, as it usually is in the case of any 
public good. 
 
Scholarship or knowledge is a public good too, and we should have similar skepticism 
about whether the unregulated market is the right way to distribute it. The entry of the big 
commercial publishers into the journals market has been widely noted, but what is not usually 
recognized is that it is not just a matter of changing journal ownership, of new actors in the 
marketplace, and of higher prices. This transformation has largely destroyed the old, university-
based system for provision of a public good (knowledge) and replaced it with an inappropriate 
(and inefficient, in the technical sense) private market, which lacks any provision for handling 
knowledge as a public good.  Let us consider the journals market again.  
 
 
The Transformation of the Journals Market 
 
In 1862, President Lincoln signed the Morrill Act, which gave each state 30,000 acres of 
government land for each of the state’s senators and representatives under the apportionment of 
1860.  The receipts of the land sale were to be invested to support at least one college whose 
“leading object” was to teach subjects related to “agriculture and the mechanic arts” so as to 
“promote the liberal and practical education of the industrial classes in the several pursuits and 
professions in life.” Since the passage of the Morrill Act, it has been widely accepted that 
dissemination of knowledge is a public responsibility. A national commitment to basic and 
applied research, and the recognition of research as a public good, became more explicit with 
Vannevar Bush’s influential report Science: The Endless Frontier, in 1945, and the subsequent 
establishment of the National Science Foundation in 1950. Now, of course, the federal 
government spends billions annually on research and development, through NSF, NIH, DOD, 
DOE, DOA, etc., and private foundations spend additional millions. There is little doubt that 
without this public subsidization of research, and that by private foundations, our society would 
be far less advanced in nearly every field. 
 
Scholars have long understood the public-goods nature of scholarship and have organized 
to ensure that their work is made freely available to the public. This arrangement has been 
dubbed a gift exchange; scholars give free access to their research and in return receive access to 
the research of others. Until recently, the only major exception to this system was in the area of 
patentable research, but essentially all other research reports were put into the gift economy.  
Scholars knew that it was in the interest of science and society for the gift exchange to work 
smoothly and thus they organized themselves into scholarly societies whose major purpose was 
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to publish journals that widely distributed the results of their inquiries. Professor Arti Kaur Rai, 
in a recent paper in the Northwestern University Law Review, summarizes this system well:  “. . . 
scientific norms promote a public domain of freely available scientific information, independent 
choice in the selection research topics, and (perhaps above all) respect for uninhibited scientific 
invention.” 
 
Beginning in the late 1960s and early 70s, this gift exchange began to break down. A few 
commercial publishers recognized that research generated at public expense and freely given for 
publication by the authors represented a commercially exploitable commodity.  These firms  
approached scholarly societies and others with a simple proposition: Let us take over the 
drudgery of  publishing, making financial arrangements, and doing inventory, pricing, and 
subscription management; this will leave you the refereeing and academic functions. In addition, 
for the right to manage the business portion of your journal, we will pay a stipend to your 
scholarly society or university. Reflecting on their experience that their low journal prices 
usually only covered costs, and sometimes even required subsidies, some of the scholarly 
societies, universities, and other publishers of journals in the gift-exchange economy accepted 
these offers.  
 
The commercial publishers, which recognized the relative inelasticity of both supply and 
demand, acquired top quality journals, and then dramatically raised prices, expecting that they 
would lose relatively little of the market. They were right.  Academics will not accept not having 
access to the top journals in their fields and demand that their university libraries provide access, 
regardless of the price. (The tendency to disregard price is aggravated by the fact that journals 
are paid for by a third-party provider, much as medical care is supplied, and many scholars do 
not even know the price their library pays for a journal subscription.) The commercial publishers 
quickly proved that prices could be set far above the level that the scholarly societies had 
established. Big profits followed.   
 
Unfortunately, many scholarly societies that chose not to sell their journals to commercial 
companies nonetheless learned a lesson from them and began raising their prices as well.  
Indeed, Carol Tenopir and Donald King, in a 2000 study (available at www.sla.org), found that 
between 1975 and 1995, commercial journal publishers raised prices by 310% in constant dollar 
terms, while society publishers raised prices by 290%.  Thus, society publishers were only a little 
more modest in price increases, remaining close behind their commercial brethren. Still, despite 
similar inflation rates, journals published by professional societies remained considerably less 
expensive than those published by commercial firms as their initial prices were fractions of those 
of commercial publishers; for example, the average library subscription price for a biomedical 
journal from a commercial publisher in 1998 was $796, more than double the average $321 price 
of a journal in the field published by a scholarly society. 
 
Thus in the last decade or two we have witnessed a dramatic transition, one that is far 
more fundamental than simply switching from non-profit to for-profit publishers. The old model 
operated on the basis of gift exchange to ensure wide distribution of what was readily 
acknowledged, indeed trumpeted, as clearly a public good. The new model operates for profit; if 
you want access, pay up, and we’ll set the prices.  
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 The Consequences of Using a Private Market to Distribute a Crucial Public Good 
 
 
Library and university budgets generally do not increase at a rate much greater than the 
consumer price index.  The real enemy to acquiring scholarly knowledge is the rate of increase in 
price, regardless of the initial price of the journal.  
 
For a university library to have maintained its journal collection unchanged from 1986 
until 2000 would have required its subscriptions budget to grow by 226%. But there were 62% 
more journals for libraries to purchase. To keep pace with both price increases and growth in 
number of journals would have required a budget roughly five times the 1986 budget – an 
increase of 428%. During this period, the average journals budget of members of the Association 
of Research Libraries rose 205%. To increase its budget for journals subscriptions, the average 
library severely cut back on monograph purchases (down by 17%) as well as other services. 
Even so, as we know, the journals budgets still fell short of what was needed, so the average 
ARL library also cut the number of its journal subscriptions by 7%. 
 
Interestingly, the most recent data on journal prices and acquisitions collected by ARL 
show that the cost of the average scholarly journals to ARL libraries dropped by 7.3% from 2000 
to 2001.    This apparent drop in unit price was accompanied by an increase of 12% in the 
number of titles acquired.    Does this remarkable change in direction indicate that the scholarly 
journals crisis ended in the year 2000?  Knowledgeable library authorities have another 
interpretation. In their view what happened is that several commercial publishers bundled their 
electronic journals into a single package referred to by librarians as “the big deal”.   Many 
librarians have signed on to this big deal because it did not increase the total price they were 
paying for journals from a given publisher.   The increase in the numbers of journals acquired 
and subsequent drop in average price per unit is the result of acquiring additional journals as part 
of these big packages.    Unfortunately, the additional journals acquired were generally not ones 
that the library placed a premium on acquiring and in signing on to the package of journals the 
libraries lost the freedom to drop individual journal subscriptions for a period of time (generally 
three years) and obligated themselves to a fixed inflation rate for the package (often 7% per year) 
for the duration.    While the view of the big deal varies among librarians it is generally thought 
that, whatever its positive merits, it is a choice forced on libraries by those with significant 
market power over them.    The consensus is that once a library has signed on to the big deal the 
publisher will be able to exert even more market power over the library.   
 
In a market economy, the response to rising prices of a commodity is either to allocate 
more money to buy the quantity desired or to buy a cheaper substitute. In a market in which 
demand is inelastic, the reaction to more purchasing power, e.g., a general increase in library 
budgets, is simply higher prices. Increasing collections budgets everywhere will only create even 
more virulent price inflation. 
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Can university libraries purchase substitute journals?  Given the importance that scholars 
and scientists place on top-tier journals, there are no acceptable substitutes.  Thus, libraries tend 
to respond to price increases for top-tier journals by paying the higher prices, cutting 
subscriptions to lower-tier journals and purchasing fewer monographs. 
 
What is lost in this bargain? Access to much new science. Journals below the top tier 
include many specialty-area journals and those in emerging fields. The process of reducing 
journal subscriptions thus makes the collection less reflective of innovation and focuses on 
established research in mainstream areas.  Many important ideas have come to science through 
lesser publications. For example, the idea of plate tectonics entered geology as heresy. As 
evidence supporting the theory grew, articles on plate tectonics gradually appeared in top-tier 
journals.  Access to only the “establishment” journals could tend to ossify science, but this may 
be one result if subscriptions to less-well-known journals are sacrificed to pay for those 
considered in the top tier. 
 
Other consequences loom as well. For example, librarians and others now increasingly 
worry about archiving, especially in the context of electronic journals. If the publisher is a 
university or professional society, it is likely to have an interest in preserving archives for future 
scholars. Will for-profit firms have a similar commitment? Will they be willing to subsidize 
archives, if necessary? What happens when a commercial publisher goes bankrupt or is acquired 
by another company?  
 
Thus, the irony. Scholarly journals are filled with material that was created by public 
subsidy.  However, access to that material is now increasingly being rationed in a manner most 
inconsistent with its public-goods nature. It is being rationed by price. Worse, the market in 
which this material is sold has so such inelastic supply and demand that the result is an 
increasingly effective transfer of resources from institutional subscribers, especially universities, 
to the commercial publishers (and some professional societies that emulate them).  Had 
university libraries’ budgets increased fourfold between 1986 and 2000, these market defects 
would likely have led to dramatically greater price  inflation but little or no additional scholarly 
information.  This is the classic public goods situation, in which markets are unable to produce 
an optimal distribution of the good.  
 
Some Partial Approaches to the Problem  
 
Various possible solutions to the problems we’ve outlined have been suggested, some 
conventional and others quite novel. It is clearly too early to draw any final conclusions about 
them, and two or three appear likely to provide some clear benefits.  But at this point none of 
these approaches appears likely to be adequate to the overall problem, in its magnitude and 
complexity.  Let’s consider these approaches.   
 
1. A Buying Cartel. The first solution might simply be to create sufficient market power 
among buyers to counter the excessive and growing power among the biggest suppliers. If 
Elsevier Science and other big publishers can use their market power to raise prices, why cannot 
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libraries create a buying consortium on the other side of the market to exert pressure in the other 
direction?   
 
There have in fact been some attempts to create associations or consortia that would 
assist libraries. For example, the recently formed Greater Western Library Alliance (originally 
the Big 12 Plus Libraries Consortium) is an association of 30 research university libraries 
designed “to deliver quality cost-effective services and resources required by clients of member 
institutions through joint action and collaboration.”  Through coordination and communication 
among librarians, and in specific cases by sharing of licenses or other collaborative 
arrangements, the associated libraries can improve services to their campuses and trim costs. 
 
One major obstacle standing in the way of Greater Western or some other group 
emerging as a buying cartel for the major universities is that it would likely be found to be in 
violation of anti-trust laws. Although it would have been stimulated by excess market power 
among publishers, anti-trust law does not sanction the creation of a countervailing cartel to even 
things up. A further obstacle is obtaining agreement from a significant number of the research 
libraries, whose circumstances vary greatly and whose willingness to participate in such an 
arrangement also varies greatly. But the biggest obstacle is simply this: Universities could not 
contemplate going without the journals and cannot credibly threaten to do so. Thus their 
bargaining power is and would be remain very slight.     
 
2. Price Controls and Antitrust. The fact that the journals market fails to have effective 
price competition, yields excessive profits, and is inefficient for providing a public good does not 
by itself necessarily imply that society should intervene. For governmental regulation to be 
effective, there must be both demonstration of an unlawful level of competitive restraint and a 
showing that there are appropriate remedies that are themselves not more expensive or more 
damaging than the existing situation. We have had enough experience with direct price 
regulation, both in individual markets and economy-wide, to know that the resulting 
dysfunctions often are not worth the gains.   
 
Governmental intervention to make the journals market more competitive might initially 
seem attractive. But it has been difficult to develop a compelling case within the constraints of 
anti-trust law, and so it has never really been tried. Even the definition of a relevant “market” is 
difficult. Journals in chemistry don’t compete with journals in economics, and even within 
chemistry, the organic chemistry journals compete only slightly with the physical chemistry 
journals. Partially because of the difficulty of defining market, the Justice Department has not 
engaged in formal anti-trust activity as mergers and acquisitions have occurred among 
commercial publishers. An additional complication is that many of the commercial publishers 
are international, making domestic anti-trust enforcement even more difficult.   
 
3. Novel regulation. A very different kind of regulation has been proposed that could in 
principle reduce the power of selected actors in the scholarly journal market and have the effect 
of eliminating the ability of the producer to charge high prices or to raise prices. 
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Two separate but parallel initiatives have drawn attention. In 1998, one of us, David 
Shulenburger, proposed the creation of the National Electronic Article Repository (NEAR).  
Under his proposal, all articles, in the form in which they were published, would be entered into 
a National Electronic Article Repository 90 days after they appeared, at which time they would 
be freely available to all. In 2000, a group of scientists centered at Stanford University began the 
Public Library of Science initiative.  This initiative places articles in PubMed Central—a public 
electronic repository operated by the National Library of Medicine of the National Institutes of 
Health-- six months after they appear in journals. The initiators of the Public Library of Science 
asked scientists to subscribe to the following pledge:  “We will publish in, edit or review for, and 
personally subscribe only to those scholarly and scientific journals that have agreed to grant 
unrestricted free distribution rights to any and all original research that they have published 
through Pubmed Central and similar online public resources within six months of their 
publication date.”  By June 15, 2002, over 30,000 scientists had signed that pledge.  
 
Both NEAR and the Public Library of Science would attempt to continue the current 
refereed-journal system of scholarly communications while curbing inflation in journal prices 
and, ultimately, making all of scholarly publishing in science available to the public for free. The 
first objective is important, as refereed scholarly journals do add value. Their management of the 
refereeing process creates significant value for scholars, allowing them to rely on published 
papers as having undergone strenuous review. Managing the review process requires resources; 
thus both NEAR and the Public Library of Science initiatives would permit journals to have the 
exclusive right to publish manuscripts for a fixed period of time (90 to 180 days). The 
assumption is that top research universities would pay to receive scholarly information upon 
publication, as their researchers would demand it. Journals thus should have subscription 
revenues sufficient to cover refereeing, editing and other publishing costs.  However, very high 
journal prices or unwarranted price increases would lead some libraries to decline to subscribe 
and their patrons would have to wait until the material was available for free. This customer 
option would cause some very expensive journals to cut their prices to retain subscribers, and all 
of them, society and commercial alike, would be cautious about price hikes. 
 
The Public Library of Science mounted a boycott by scientists in an attempt to compel 
journals to place all issues older than 180 days into a public archive.  In spite of the signatures of 
more than 30,000 scientists on the petition agreeing to the boycott, however, few journals have 
capitulated.  In December 2002, the Public Library of Science, having failed in its boycott of 
publishers, announced receipt of a major foundation grant to underwrite the creation of on-line 
journals to compete with expensive commercial journals. On-going operating costs for these 
journals are to be obtained by charging authors (or their universities) $1,500 per article 
published. This venture eliminates entirely subscription charges but it shifts the cost of journals 
to research universities. While the overall cost of a journal financed in this manner might be 
lower than that of commercial journals, it surely will seem inequitable to research universities 
that they are being asked to pay to publish research in addition to the cost of supporting their 
faculty who produce the research. In addition, this method of funding is subject to exploitation 
by commercial journals that, from the authors’ perspectives, publish their articles for free. 
Indeed, many commercial journals got their start by committing to publish research work free of 
the “page charges” to authors that society journals were then beginning to charge. Finding 
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foundation or other sources of financial support to cover such author charges would eliminate 
this problem but it is doubtful that there is sufficient foundation support available to permit all 
journals to follow this financial model. 
 
While both NEAR and the Public Library of Science offer novel approaches, a hard-
headed appraisal would suggest that they must overcome significant hurdles if they are to 
transform the scholarly journals market.  NEAR of course has never been implemented.   
 
4. New competition.  Yet another approach, creating new competitors in the initial 
marketplace, is in some ways more promising. SPARC (the Scholarly Publishing and Academic 
Resources Coalition), for example, is a cooperative venture that libraries created to increase 
competition.  A number of journals have been spawned by SPARC to be in direct competition 
with commercial journals.  Products like Bio-One, a collection of scholarly society journals 
largely belonging to the American Institute of Biological Sciences, have been assembled as an 
electronic database in an effort to keep those journals available at a modest price.  In addition, 
SPARC has assisted on several occasions when journal editors simply walked away from 
commercial enterprises and decided to create competitive journals on their own.   
 
SPARC has shown some indications of success.  Journals that are facing new competitors 
have reduced their rate of price increase. In other cases, commercial journals approached 
financial failure when the SPARC journal became established, leaving the SPARC journal as the 
remaining venue.   
 
More time will show how effective SPARC is. The difficulty is scale. To date, SPARC 
has directly or indirectly affected only about 100 or fewer journals out of the 161,000 titles listed 
by Ulrich.  Some fear that SPARC will inadvertently increase the problem by adding to the 
number of journals that libraries must take if SPARC publications compete with, but do not 
replace, older journals.  
 
5. Open Archives Initiative and Open Access Journals. Cornell physicist Paul Ginsparg  
initiated an open electronic archive in which more than 70% of all papers published in physics 
journals now appear either in manuscript or in the form in which they appear in their respective 
journal. Authors self-archive their work on this site, making it available at no cost to all who 
want to see it. The cost per paper on the website is $1 per year. Many academic physicists go to 
this website first for access to the physics literature. Even if a physicist’s university does not 
subscribe to certain physics journals, all of the physics literature is available through this server.  
Ginsparg received a MacArthur Fellowship in 2002 in recognition of this effort. 
 
The success of this website has spawned other websites in the areas of psychology, 
economics, and mathematics, although none of them appears to contain so large a portion of a 
particular discipline’s literature as does Ginsparg’s original. At research universities throughout 
the world there is now much interest in promoting the creation of such open archives that would 
contain all the research manuscripts published by faculty at each institution. Were every research 
manuscript placed in such an open archive and were these archives created to common standards, 
it would be possible to obtain any research manuscript by doing a single world-wide search of 
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those archives. Such an environment would eliminate the ability of journals to command large 
prices for journal subscriptions, as there would be no need to subscribe in order to obtain easy 
access to articles. We note that commercial publishers have not been able to dominate the field 
of physics, perhaps as a result of the existence of the Ginsparg archive. 
 
At this point, a relatively small and unknown proportion of the scholarly literature is on 
such institutional archives. Only in select areas of physics is it possible for a scholar to rely on 
the archives for access to most of the literature. Ultimately we expect that most research 
universities will develop archives for their faculty’s work, but it is not clear that all faculty 
research will appear on such servers. 
 
While many journals now permit work that they publish to appear (with proper 
attribution to the journal) on the author’s local website, some journals maintain tight restrictions 
that prohibit consideration for publication if even a near draft of the manuscript submitted to 
them appears on a publicly accessible website. From their perspective, placement on such a 
website constitutes “prior publication.” Any possibility that putting a manuscript on a website 
might jeopardize publication in a scholarly journal would ensure that many faculty would not use 
institutional repositories. If archives do not permit complete access to literature, their presence 
will not further science or drive down journal prices. 
 
There are many reasons for research institutions to develop open archives even if they are 
not complete. Without secure electronic archives, many manuscripts that exist only in electronic 
form will be lost. This fact alone justifies their development.  
 
In April of 2003 meeting in Chevy Chase, Maryland, a group of scientists, including 
several Nobel Laureates, librarians and scholarly societies adopted a set of principles designed to 
further the open access model of publication.  “Open Access” journals are free to access and are 
generally refereed.   That set of principles affirms the need for all scientific scholarship to be 
freely available to scholars but specifies that open access models require fees of authors that 
permit researchers at “demonstrated financial disadvantage to publish” in them.   Public Library 
of Science, a participant in the meeting has agreed that it will not let financial disadvantage 
prohibit anyone from publishing in its new journals.   The Howard Hughes Medical Institute has 
agreed to cover publisher charges when any of the investigators it funds publish in open access 
journals.   On June 17, 2003, it was announced that all universities in the United Kingdom have 
become members of the open access group of journals published by BioMed Central and 
submissions charges will be paid through funding from the UK’s Joint Information Systems 
Committee for all of their faculty members when they publish in the organization’s more than 90 
peer reviewed journals. 
While there is much activity in the open access journal movement, the essential economic 
facts were well stated by David Prosser in the April 2003 ARL Bimonthly Report: “Open access 
journals are not free journals--only free to the reader. There are significant costs in the peer-
review process and production of a journal (even if it is only online). Open access journals will 
survive only if they can raise sufficient funds to cover the costs of publication (plus whatever 
profit margin is considered reasonable by the journals' owners and is supported by the market).”   
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A truly sustainable model must contain a revenue stream that guarantees coverage of the very 
real costs of producing peer-reviewed journals. Open access journals supported by submission 
fees would have a revenue stream.  However, advocates of open access have not demonstrated 
that their model would be superior to relying on subscription fees.  With no mechanism to reduce 
costs of publication or to force reduction in profit margins, open access will simply shift the 
already excessive payment burden from libraries to authors (or other costs centers in the 
university).    University budgets can probably be stretched to cover the costs of open archives 
provided that such archives emulate the non-refereed, non-edited model of the physics archive. 
 
What’s To Be Done?  
Ensuring Public Access to Publicly-Funded Research 
 
If the crisis in scholarly journals publishing is to end, however, a broader and quite 
different approach will be needed. The public’s and the academy’s access to scholarly 
communication – or more particularly that communication arising from publicly funded research 
– could be accomplished by a federal law requiring that all research arising from federally 
funded grants be placed by the publisher in a freely accessible electronic archive within, say, six 
months of publication in a scholarly journal.  
 
The United States government believes so strongly that research is a public good that 
NSF, NIH, and the research divisions of other federal agencies are funded with public dollars so 
that scientists will create research for the benefit of the larger society. It is nonsensical to provide 
billions each year for research and then completely ignore the mechanism by which the results of 
that research are disseminated. Since the market does not work to adequately distribute research 
findings to the academy, the funding agencies should take steps to see that what they fund is 
ultimately available to researchers for free. Fortunately, there is a simple way to ensure that 
federally funded research is disseminated. 
 
A federal statute should require that, as a condition for accepting a federal research grant, 
the scientist or scholar agrees to place each article reporting results from the research in a free, 
publicly accessible electronic domain after some period, say six months, of exclusive publication 
in a journal or other medium. The journal publisher would thus temporarily retain exclusive 
rights to an article and even afterwards would likely continue to find a market for its journals. 
The journal publisher would be selling the value that the journal itself adds to the article, for 
example in refereeing, certification, and convenience, rather than the full value--which includes 
the research itself plus the value added by the journal. Research libraries would pay some price 
to have the most current research but prices would have to fall from current levels or libraries 
would wait for free information to become available in six months.  (Since the funding agency 
and the researcher paid for the content of the article, the publisher has no legitimate property 
claim on its value; the research itself was contributed to the public in the gift economy.)   
 
Publishers could maintain free-access archives on their own servers, but a fail-safe 
backup would be needed should choice or financial forces cause them not to do so. Federal 
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research agencies should be required by the statute to make available a permanent electronic 
archive for receiving these articles and making them available. 
 
Of course private foundations, state and local governments, and foreign governments also 
fund research. We do not advocate requiring the research they finance to be subject to these 
provisions, because in the case of private foundations it could threaten the insulation from 
federal sought by their founders, and in the case of state governments, there is arguably a 
constitutional conflict. Nonetheless, we hope such entities will seize on the logic used here and 
choose to follow the same rules that we advocate for publication of the scholarship they fund.  
 
With this simple act, much of the crisis in scholarly communications would end. Those 
articles deemed to be public goods by virtue of public funding, would be free to all interested 
parties after a set period.  Journals, both societal and commercial, could continue in their 
traditional roles and could command limited subscription revenue to support their efforts.  As a 
byproduct, the problem of permanently archiving electronic journal material would be assigned 
to the funding agencies.  This aspect of the solution is critically important, as neither lightly 
capitalized societies nor commercial publishers (who may not have a fiscal incentive to archive 
material permanently) can be relied on to perform this function.  For those who worry about 
placing this material solely in government hands, the law should permit the free copying by 
others of all or part of the archive for non-commercial use. 
 
We note with some pleasure that Minnesota Representative Martin Sabo introduced the 
Public Access to Science Act in June 2003.   That act resembles our proposal in that it makes 
journal articles that arise from federal grants and contracts available for free.   Unfortunately it 
does so by declaring that “Copyright protection . . .  is not available for any work produced 
pursuant to scientific research substantially funded by the Federal Government . . .”     This 
method of making such work  freely available has two adverse consequences:   First,  the 
removal of copyright protection eliminates all the ownership rights, not just the right to restrict 
free access to the material.   A scientist’s ideas belong to that scientist and that ownership is 
protected by the copyright act.   Without copyright protection one can amend what appears under 
the author’s name without the author having any recourse.   Second, the removal of copyright 
protection means that no one can have the exclusive right to publish a work even for a limited 
period of time.    Removal of this right severely limits the ability of a journal publishing the work 
to earn enough from publication to cover costs as anyone is free to publish the same article 
immediately.     Our proposal provides sufficient financial incentive for publishers by permitting 
a limited window in which exclusive publication rights belong to them, that is a window in 
which they have something of market value to sell. In addition, there are many large commercial 
vested interests in the existing copyright law.  Removing copyright will needlessly involve them 
in political maneuvering.  By contrast, attaching reform measures to the granting of public funds 
for research targets the reform to the specific problem of access to scientific research.    
 
The adoption of our plan will constitute a loss to commercial publishers that have been 
making extraordinary profits by selling public goods at high prices and to scholarly societies that 
have been supporting non-publishing activities from journal revenues. The adoption of the Sabo 
plan  might result in the loss of all revenues to such journals and ultimately eliminate their 
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publication entirely. Journals in fields where federal support for research is absent will not be 
affected.  They would remain in the private arena.  Journals that publish a mixture of federally 
funded and non-funded research could choose whether to submit all manuscripts to the archive or 
only those that resulted from federal support. We would hope that foreign funding agencies 
would opt to follow the depository plan outlined, as the public goods argument applies fully to 
the research they choose to fund. 
 
Publishers could decide  to exclude any author’s research stemming from federal funding 
and thus exempt themselves from the electronic archive requirement. The value of their journals 
undoubtedly would fall, however, and eventually their subscription prices would have to fall as 
well.  
 
The academy and the process of scientific inquiry are suffering because research, much 
of which is funded with tax dollars for the benefit of the public, is being priced and sold by for-
profit publishers and some scholarly societies as a private commodity.  Our call is to return the 
results of publicly funded research to their proper status as a public good.  
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